The Indian Government announced its formal nuclear doctrine on 4 January 2003, almost five years after testing its nuclear weapons capability in May 1998. While the one-page document was vague and subject to interpretation, what was clear was that it reiterated India's 'No First Use' policy.

This Issue Brief is based on proceedings of a workshop re-examining India's nuclear doctrine, organised by the ORF's National Security Initiative and held in New Delhi in August 2014.

The key points that emerged from the discussions are the following:

India needs to make its nuclear doctrine public in order to avoid misunderstanding or miscalculation in an ever-changing global and regional security environment. The lack of information in the public domain has created a perception that India lacks a defined doctrine or that if there was, it was flawed
India's nuclear deterrent is to deter nuclear threats and attacks. It is not meant to achieve a deterrent against conventional weapons
No First Use (NFU) policy takes into account the very specific security environment surrounding India, given the relationship between Pakistan and China
Tactical nuclear weapons being deployed by Pakistan will have a strategic impact if used. Any weapon which requires the authority of the national command authority is strategic; no distinction exists
in the backdrop of reduced interest on disarmament, countries around the world are making qualitative improvements to their nuclear weapons while reducing the quantitative part of their arsenals
doubts exist about China's NFU, and their idea about de-escalation using nuclear weapons is complicated. Their forces are oriented towards retaliation and not nuclear war fighting