This paper addresses the question: how would different governance priorities affect the institutional arrangements for a credible financing mechanism in the climate regime?  The paper identifies various funding channels:

multilateral development bank (MDB) funds
United Nations fund
government-promoted funds
public-private investment funds
carbon markets
unilateral fiscal support

The author further identifies the key concerns of contributing and beneficiary parties - including concerns such as monitoring, aid versus grant and prioritisation of adaptation. It is noted that, according to the Cancun Agreements, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) is accountable to and under guidance of the Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC. A Standing Committee will further be established to improve coordination and monitoring/reporting/verification (MRV) of finance. Using this governance framework, the paper evaluates four different design options:

consolidate and specialise
create and legitimise
innovate and de-bureaucratise
separate and indigenise

The author argues that the governance of finance is a major stumbling block to securing international cooperation on climate change. It is acknowledged that the institutional design options offered in this paper are far from ideal, but they offer a change. As power shifts in climate negotiations, the author argues that it is important to find ways to ensure that leading countries do not exit the playing field entirely, leaving the smaller players with neither money nor technology. The GCF might suffer a similar fate if parties do not recognise the trade-offs between voice, co-ordination, scale, and the different kinds of actions that are necessary to confront climate change. In conclusion, it is argued that compromises will be necessary, but they will have to be honest and upfront if a modicum of trust has to be restored in climate negotiations.